[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[escepticos] RE: [escepticos] RE: [escepticos] Presentación formal en sociedad



Quine (más tarde también Gödel) asestó un golpe mortal a la concepción
de verdad como concordancia del enunciado con la realidad (o lo que es
lo mismo, negó la concepción del significado como valor de verdad de la
proposición). Su argumento se conoce como "slingshot", básicamente viene
a decir que la sustitución salva veritatem de los significantes, siempre
y cuando se conserve el significado (entendido únicamente como valor de
verdad, insisto) conduce a falacias de dimensiones épicas. 

(El siguiente texto está extraido de
http://wwwprof.uniandes.edu.co/~jmejia/tesis/7-interpretation.htm)

Suppose the following three sentences are true:

(1) Alejandro Toledo won the 2001 presidential elections in Peru

(2) Alejandro Toledo is different from the composer of Bolero

(3) The composer of Bolero was French

Let us call the facts referred to by these sentences f1, f2, and f3,
respectively.  f1 would also be the fact referred to by

(4) Alejandro Toledo is the only thing which is the same as Alejandro
Toledo, and which won the 2001 presidential elections in Peru

because it would be the same fact that would make true (1) and (4).
Similarly f2 would also be referred to by (5):

(5) Alejandro Toledo is the only thing which is the same as Alejandro
Toledo, and which is different from the composer of Bolero

The predicates of (4) and (5) are definite descriptions of unique
things; and for these two descriptions that unique thing is the same;
namely the person called Alejandro Toledo.  If these descriptions are
treated as complex singular terms referring to things (things like
Alejandro Toledo), then changing a singular term contained in it for
another with the same referent will not change the referent of the
containing complex singular term[iii].  Given this, then (4) and (5)
refer to the same fact.  Therefore f1 is the same as f2.

Similarly, (6) and (7) would refer to the same facts as (2) and (3)
respectively; that is, to f2 and f3:

(6) The composer of Bolero is the only thing which is the same as the
composer of Bolero, and which is different from Alejandro Toledo

(7) The composer of Bolero is the only thing which is the same as the
composer of Bolero, and which was French

And for the same reasons as expressed above in relation to (4) and (5),
f2 would be the same as f3.  Given that f1 was established to be the
same as f2, then all three facts are the same.  But it is strange to
think that the fact denoted by the sentence ?Alejandro Toledo won the
2001 presidential elections in Peru? is the same as the fact denoted by
?the composer of Bolero was French?.  What do these two sentences have
in common?  The answer is simply that they both are true. And, extending
the argument, all true sentences refer to the same fact.  Facts,
according to this argument, cannot be individuated such that they are
the referents of [true] sentences and simultaneously distinguish them
according to their meaning.  There seems, then, to be nothing like a
reality which is already divided up into pieces which are [or can be]
denoted by true sentences; nothing like a world which, as Rorty has put
it, ?splits itself up, on its own initiative, into sentence-shaped
chunks called ?facts??

La verdad de los enunciados es indistinguible de su verdad lógica, esto
es, existen infinitas preposiciones que son verdaderas lógicamente pero
son falsas de hecho. No se puede basar una noción de verdad "práctica"
en la distinción entre creencia y verdad de hecho. No existe cosa tal
como la verdad de hecho, de hecho.

Un saludo

Fernando








-----Original Message-----
From: owner-escepticos en dis.ulpgc.es
[mailto:owner-escepticos en dis.ulpgc.es] On Behalf Of Claudio
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2004 11:13 PM
To: escepticos en dis.ulpgc.es
Subject: [escepticos] RE: [escepticos] Presentación formal en sociedad



Ernesto: Agarra al tiempo de las alas, pega media vuelta y cabalga
fuerte hasta 1998. Esto que ha escrito este recién llegado:

>No hay una relación directa entre una creencia y la verdad de su 
>enunciado; la creencia es una actitud subjetiva que puede basarse en 
>razones, mientras que la verdad es una propiedad del enunciado, que 
>puede demostrarse. Hay que distinguir entre creer y saber.

es lo que te he querido decir desde entonces. Lo único que a mi me
salían formulitas lógicas y todo eso.



------------------------------------------
Claudio Uribe

--------
E-mail y acceso a Internet UltraVeloz totalmente GRATIS en Buenos Aires,
Rosario, Cordoba, Mendoza, La Plata y Pilar http://www.Argentina.com 
Nro. de acceso 5078-5000 Usuario: Argentina Password: Argentina